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McCone, With Much to Learn About CIA, Must Revamp Agency While Operating It Efficiently

Group's Upheaval Began With Cuban Fiasco—New Director Clash With Eisenhower Administration in Advocating Nuclear Tests.

By MARQUIS W. CHILDS

A Washington Correspondent of the Post-Dispatch.

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WHEN JOHN A. McCONE takes over the Central Intelligence Agency he will have a great deal to learn about a vast apparatus that spends several times as much as the State Department. He will also, and this may be an even more difficult assignment, face the need to make drastic changes in the function and structure of CIA.

On his desk he will find a series of recommendations by the President's foreign intelligence advisory board headed by James R. Killian Jr. of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. They call for drastic surgery on the organization that has grown to extraordinary size in the post-war era.

How will it be performed—even whether it will be performed—depends on McCone, the new director. But, as one of those assigned by the President to look into CIA after the Cuban fiasco put it, the surgical operation must not be allowed to interfere with the day-to-day functioning of an agency considered vital to America's security.

For CIA, which may spend secretly as much as two to three times the \$279,000,000 budget of the State Department, this is a period of upheaval. It began with the Cuban invasion. In a flood of public criticism, the CIA was charged with "selling" that tragic misadventure to the President on the basis of intelligence reports predicting that a small landing operation would cause Cubans to overthrow Castro. Sober judges taking part in the post-mortem believe the basic charge is unjustified.

ON TOP OF THIS, the CIA has been building a large structure on the Potomac in Virginia to house most of the agency. The new home for 10,000 employees is nearing completion and the locked files are being moved out under armed guard and in utmost secrecy from the temporary buildings CIA has occupied.

proof, he believed the Russians were testing secretly. On at least one occasion he clashed with considerable heat with Secretary of State Christian A. Herter on this issue.

DULLES, in the view of those who surveyed the agency, was a "case operator" and a superb one. His passion was to follow the covert operations of CIA with all his wide knowledge of men and events and his operating skill. But he was no administrator and the CIA expanded like a balloon on a hot day.

The intelligence bureaucracy is truly formidable. The three military intelligence services — Army, Navy, Air Force — have been compressed into a Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA. Its reports go to the CIA's Board of National Estimates which in turn passes them on to the United States Intelligence Board headed by the CIA director.

Six members of the USIB come from the Defense Department and DIA. Then the final report goes to the President and the National Security Council. That, in greatly over-simplified form, is the structure which McCone must manage.

The CIA's new building provides 1,000,000 square feet of space for the agency, plus 600,000 for corridors and service areas. It is 926 feet long and 475 feet wide. This is said to be roughly one third the capacity of the Pentagon. It has an auditorium, a reinforced concrete, dome-shaped structure, seating 600 persons. Two parking lots covering 21 acres provide space for 3000 automobiles.

THE BUILDING was Dulles's dream. The retiring director, a brother of the late John Foster Dulles, had made known shortly before his sixty-eighth birthday anniversary in April his desire to step out. He has had a strenuous career, including four years of operation in World War II in Switzerland where he maintained contact with the Nazis plotting Hitler's overthrow and obtained much valuable secret information.

The U-2 Incident a year ago and the Cuban fiasco were blows to Dulles. In each instance he offered to resign and accept the responsibility, but President Eisenhower and President Kennedy declined to accept the resignations, which they felt would appear as evasion of their responsibilities.

What the foreign intelligence advisory board has recommended in the way of sweeping

thing else connected with CIA, a carefully guarded secret. There has been discussion of separating the two principal functions of CIA. One is the overt and more or less open function of collecting intelligence data and evaluating them.

THE OTHER function is the cloak-and-dagger one of secret espionage and counter-revolution. It has been suggested that the latter operation, particularly where paramilitary action is concerned, be turned over to the Defense Department. Whether this will be done depends on McCone and his appraisal of CIA and its future.

A frequent criticism of the agency is that in its swift expansion it has tended to overshadow the State Department and the Foreign Service which, under law, has the authority to conduct the foreign policy of the United States.

In almost every embassy in the world, CIA agents have a "cover" serving on the ambassador's staff. Ambassadors have in some instances complained that these CIA men fail to take the lead of the mission into their confidence in their freewheeling operations. The most conspicuous example was in Laos, where the United States, in alliance with France, ignored the embassy in trying out a policy of their own to replace a neutral government with one actively on the side of the west.

American correspondents such as Keyes Bafford of the St. Louis Daily News, writing from the Laotian capital of Vientiane, have been sharply critical of the intervention of the CIA in crude and in the end futile cloak-and-dagger performance.

THE ANSWER of CIA men is that, if the CIA were strong enough and had the authority that it believes it has by law, that sort of thing would never happen. It is felt, where ambassadors are weak or indifferent that this occurs. But the fact is that CIA has almost unlimited funds to spend with no accountability to Congress or the public while the State Department is often hard pressed to find money for routine tasks.

The question of accountability is also very much to the fore. Members of Congress have felt that some committee, if not an appropriations committee then a